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Abstract—Recently researchers have proposed using deep
learning-based systems for malware detection. Unfortunately, all
deep learning classification systems are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks where miscreants can avoid detection by the classification
algorithm with very few perturbations of the input data. Previous
work has studied adversarial attacks against static analysis-
based malware classifiers which only classify the content of the
unknown file without execution. However, since the majority of
malware is either packed or encrypted, malware classification
based on static analysis often fails to detect these types of files.
To overcome this limitation, anti-malware companies typically
perform dynamic analysis by emulating each file in the anti-
malware engine or performing in-depth scanning in a virtual
machine. These strategies allow the analysis of the malware
after unpacking or decryption. In this work, we study different
strategies of crafting adversarial samples for dynamic analysis.
These strategies operate on sparse, binary inputs in contrast
to continuous inputs such as pixels in images. We then study
the effects of two, previously proposed defensive mechanisms
against crafted adversarial samples including the distillation and
ensemble defenses. We also propose and evaluate the weight
decay defense. Experiments show that with these three defensive
strategies, the number of successfully crafted adversarial samples
is reduced compared to a standard baseline system without
any defenses. In particular, the ensemble defense is the most
resilient to adversarial attacks. Importantly, none of the defenses
significantly reduce the classification accuracy for detecting
malware. Finally, we demonstrate that while adding additional
hidden layers to neural models does not significantly improve the
malware classification accuracy, it does significantly increase the
classifier’s robustness to adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is an important emerging application in ar-
tificial intelligence. As commercial and open source software
authors improve the security of their applications, and orga-
nizations deploy advanced threat detection systems to harden
their defenses, attackers will be forced to employ more sophis-
ticated attacks in order to infect a computer or penetrate an
organization’s network. One of the primary computer security
defenses continues to be commercial anti-malware products. A
number of researchers [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] have proposed
the use of deep learning for malware classification as a key
component of next generation anti-malware systems.
Recently, researchers have also started to study the attacks
and defenses of machine learning-based classification systems,
and this area is commonly known as adversarial learning. In
* Jack Stokes and De Wang made equal contributions to this work.
an adversarial learning-based attack, miscreants intentionally
craft malicious samples which are designed to confuse (i.e.,
fool) a deployed machine learning model. An adversarial
sample is one whose input data is altered in such a way that
the perturbation does not change its ground truth label, but the
altered sample is misclassified by a trained machine learning
model. In some cases, such as images [7], the goal is to alter
these samples in such a way that they are not perceived by
humans to be intentionally corrupted. To be more specific,
by perturbing a tiny fraction of the raw input vector features
(e.g., pixels) or adding noise with a very small magnitude
compared to the original input vector [8], the crafted sample
will be misclassified as belonging to a different class. In some
cases, the attacker decides to target the mispredicted class to
be any desired class. It is a phenomenon that has appeared in
some of the deep learning literature [8], [9], but it also exists
in shallow linear models [10].
While many authors have focused on adversarial learning-
based attacks, only a few defenses have been proposed. Good-
fellow, et al., [8] proposed training with adversarial samples.
In 2015, Papernot, et al., [11] proposed the distillation defense
for adversarial learning. More recently, several authors have
proposed an ensemble defense [12], [13], [14], [15] for adver-
sarial samples. Xu, et al., [16] proposed a feature squeezing
system to detect potential adversarial samples by measuring
the difference between the original model and a new model
where unnecessary input features have been removed.
Most of the previous research in adversarial learning has
typically focused on non-adversarial datasets such as images
[7], [8]. Malware classification, on the other hand, is arguably
one of the most adversarial environments. To date, relatively
few studies have investigated adversarial learning in the field
of malware classification. Several papers have focused on
the attack side. Hu, et al., [10] study adversarial learning
in the context of linear classifiers which are designed to
detect malicious PDF (i.e., Adobe Portable Document Format)
documents. In [17], Tong, et al., study the effects of iteratively
altering malicious PDFs to avoid detection. Hu and Tan [18]
propose a generative adversarial network (GAN) for crafting
adversarial, malicious Android executable files.
Others have investigated defenses against adversarial mal-
ware attacks. Grosse, et al., [19] analyze the distillation
defense for a static analysis-based, deep malware classification
system which only classifies the raw content of the file without
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execution. In [20], Grosse, et al., propose a statistical test for
detecting adversarial malware examples.
In this paper, we implement and study several adversarial
learning-based attacks and defenses for dynamic analysis-
based, deep learning malware classification systems. All clas-
sification models employ deep neural networks (DNNs). We
study six different strategies of crafting adversarial malware
samples based on the removal of malicious features and
the addition of benign features. We evaluate three different
defenses for these attacks including the distillation defense as
well as the ensemble defense. We also propose and analyze
a new weight decay defense. Results show that the ensemble
defense outperforms the other two defenses by a significant
margin. Most models yield a similar classification accuracy
compared to their baseline systems, which satisfies a key
goal of defensive adversarial learning that the defense does
not negatively affect the overall detection capability. Finally,
while adding additional hidden layers to a neural model only
improves the accuracy in a few scenarios, we demonstrate
that a deep neural network offers much better resiliency to
adversarial samples compared to its shallow baseline model
counterpart. Furthermore, the resiliency continues to increase
as the number of hidden layers in the DNN increases. A
summary of the main contributions of this work includes:
• We are the first to study the efficacy of the distillation
defense for dynamic analysis-based, deep malware clas-
sification.
• We propose the weight decay defense and analyze its
performance in the context of malware classification.
• We show that the ensemble defense is superior in the
context of deep malware classification.
• We demonstrate that adding additional hidden layers sig-
nificantly increases the resiliency to adversarial attacks.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the
defender’s training and evaluation systems as well as the threat
model which includes the assumptions about the attacker and
the detection strategies.
System Overview: The system overview is depicted in
Figure 1. The original data for this study was collected by
scanning a large collection of Windows portable executable
(PE) files with a production version of a commercial anti-
malware engine which had been modified to generate two
sets of logs for each file including unpacked file strings and
system API (application protocol interface) calls including
their parameters. Before an unknown file is executed on the
actual operating system, the anti-malware engine fist analyzes
the file with its lightweight emulator which induces the dy-
namic behavior of the file. The first log file that is generated
during emulation is a set of unpacked file strings. Typically,
a malware file is packed, or encrypted, to make it difficult
to reverse engineer by malware analysts. During emulation,
text strings, which are included in the PE files, are unpacked
and written to the system memory. The emulator’s system
memory is next scanned to recover null terminated objects
which include the original text strings. In addition, the engine
also logs the sequence of API calls and their parameters which
are generated during execution. This sequence provides an
indication of the dynamic behavior of the unknown file.
From these two log files, we generate three sets of sparse
binary features for our deep learning models. We consider each
distinct, unpacked file string as a potential feature. Two sets
of features are derived from the system call data. First, we
generate a potential feature for each distinct value of an API
call and input parameter value for a specific input position.
Second, we generate all possible combinations of API trigrams
(i.e., (k) API call, (k+1) API call, (k+2) API call) as a feature
which represents the local behavior of the file.
There are tens of millions of potential features which are
generated from the three sets of raw features. Since the neural
network cannot process this extremely large set of data, we
utilize feature selection using mutual information [21] in order
to reduce the final feature set to 50,000 features. If any
of these final features are generated during emulation, the
corresponding feature will be set to 1 in the sparse, binary
input feature for that file. This set of feature vectors is then
used to train the deep learning model which has been enhanced
to defend against adversarial attacks.
We assume the attacker has knowledge of the selected
features and the trained DNN model. With this information,
they are able to craft adversarial malware samples which
are processed by the anti-malware engine and the identical
inference engine. The goal of the attacker is for their malware
sample to have a benign prediction.
Threat Model: We follow earlier work [11] and assume
that the attacker has access to all of the model parameters and
operating thresholds. For an ensemble classification system,
we assume that the attacker has obtained all parameters and
threshold values for each classifier in the ensemble. This is
the most challenging scenario to protect. Once the attacker
has successfully obtained of the parameters for the model or
ensemble of models, we assume they implement the Jacobian-
based strategies proposed in [11], [22] to determine the ranking
of important malicious and benign features.
Modern anti-malware systems consist of two main com-
ponents: an anti-malware client on the user’s computer and
a backend web service which processes queries from all of
the individual anti-malware clients. It would be difficult and
most likely require a successful spearphishing campaign to
obtain any classification models running in a backend web
service. However it would be much easier to reverse engineer
a malware classifier’s parameters and threshold values running
on a user’s client computer.
All of the data is generated by the anti-malware engine’s
emulator running in a virtual machine without external net-
work access. We assume that malware does not detect that it
is being emulated and halt all malicious activity. We further
assume that the malware does not alter its behavior due to the
lack of external internet access.
Finally, in several of the attack strategies proposed in
the next section, we assume that the malware author can
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Fig. 1: Overview of the adversarial attack and defense of a dynamic analysis-based malware classification system.
remove key features related to malicious activity (i.e., mal-
ware features) while maintaining its ability to achieve the
desired malicious objective. Since most malware is either
packed or encrypted, our analysis is based on the behavior
of the malicious code, and we use a dataset of over 2.3
million malware and benign files in this study, it is impossible
for us to actually modify the malware to remove malicious
features. Removing important malicious content may actually
transforms the malware into a benign file. However, attackers
often employ metamorphic strategies to use alternate code
paths to reach the desired malicious objective [23]. In order
to continue to perform its desired malicious behavior, we
assume the attacker has the ability to engineer an alternative
attack strategy. For example, instead of writing a value to the
registry, the attacker may choose to instead write important
data to a local file or memory. In other cases, the attacker
may re-implement key functions of the operating system. We,
therefore, assume the attacker has the ability to effectively
remove malicious features by re-implementing the key pieces
of the malware’s code related to the most important malicious
features.
III. BASELINE DNN MALWARE CLASSIFIER
Before discussing the strategies for crafting and defending
against adversarial samples, we first review the baseline deep
neural network malware classifier which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. We follow earlier work in [1] and use a sparse random
projection matrix [24] to reduce the input feature dimension
from 50,000 to 4,000 for the DNN’s input layer. The sparse
random projection matrix R is initialized with 1 and -1 as
Pr(Ri,j = 1) = Pr(Ri,j = −1) = 1
2
√
d
(1)
where d is the size of the original input feature vector. All
hidden layers have a dimension of 2000. Following [4], we
use the rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function,
and dropout [25] is utilized with the dropout rate set to 25%.
All inputs to the DNN are normalized to have zero mean and
unit variance. The output layer employs the softmax function
to generate probabilities for the output predictions:
softmax(x) = exp(x)/
c∑
i=1
(exp(xi)). (2)
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Fig. 2: Model of the baseline deep neural network malware
classifier.
IV. CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
In this section, we describe six iterative strategies for
crafting adversarial samples. Essentially, the attacker’s strategy
is to first discover features that have the most influence on the
classification output, and then alter their malware to control
these features. The Jacobian, which is the forward derivative
of the output with respect to the original input, has been
proposed in [11], [22] as a good criterion to help determine
these features. For a malware classifier, the prediction output
indicates that an unknown file is either malicious or benign.
Thus, the attacker’s goal is to alter (i.e., perturb) the important
features such that the malware classification model incorrectly
predicts that a malicious file is benign. To compromise the
malware classifier, the attacker can modify their malware
to decrease the number of features that are important for a
malware prediction, increase the number of features that lead
to a benign prediction, or both.
For each iterative attack strategy that simulates an attacker
modifying their malware, we alter one feature during each
iteration and then re-evaluate the Jacobian with respect to the
perturbed sample. We analyze six strategies to craft adversarial
samples. The first three methods use the Jacobian informa-
tion [11], [22] to identify which features to alter:
(1) dec pos, i.e., disabling the features that would lead the
classifier to predict that an unknown file is malware based on
the Jacobian of the classification output with respect to the
original input features. We define a feature to be a positive
feature if the Jacobian with respect to the feature is positive.
We call these features positive features since they are the key
indicators of malware behavior.
(2) inc neg, i.e., enabling the features that would lead a
classifier to predict that an unknown file is benign. These fea-
tures are called negative features with respect to the malware
class. A negative feature has a positive Jacobian with respect
to the benign class.
(3) dec pos + inc neg, i.e., alternatively disabling one pos-
itive feature for one iteration and then enabling one negative
feature in the next iteration. This strategy investigates whether
there is any synergy between removing malicious content and
adding benign features in a round robin fashion.
In contrast to the above methods that use the Jacobian in-
formation, we also include three, similar “randomized” strate-
gies that do not use the Jacobian for comparison. For these
additional algorithms, we randomly select positive features to
disable or negative features to enable instead of selecting them
using the rank of the Jacobian’s forward derivatives. Thus,
the additional strategies include: (4) randomized dec pos, (5)
randomized inc neg random, and (6) randomized dec pos +
inc neg.
V. KNOWLEDGE DISTILLATION
In this section, we review the basics of knowledge distilla-
tion, which is used in the next section in one of the defensive
mechanisms. Knowledge distillation is the procedure to distill
the knowledge learned in one model (teacher model) into
another model (student model) which is usually smaller in size.
The student model, which mimics the performance of teacher
model, can then be deployed to save computational cost. Dark
Knowledge [26] is proposed by Hinton, et al., to improve
the model’s distillation performance. Instead of using the
predicted hard labels as training targets, dark knowledge uses
the predicted probability p = [p1, p2, ..., pc] (∀i, 0 < pi < 1,
and pi is the probability of a sample being predicted to belong
to class i) of the teacher model as the training target. The
probability scores are also known as soft targets, in contrast to
the hard targets of the original {0, 1} labels. Dark knowledge
argues that the probability scores capture the relationship
between classes. Taking the MNIST dataset for example, digits
1 and 7 appear more similar than 1 and 8, so the prediction
of a hand-written digit with a ground truth of 1 is usually
classified with a higher probability of 7 than 8. By utilizing the
relationship between classes, the teacher model communicates
more information to the student model, which helps train the
student model to better mimic the complex non-linear function
learned by the teacher model.
An issue with using the standard softmax function in (2) in
the final output layer of the baseline DNN is that it causes
the output probability scores to concentrate on one class,
thereby reducing the correlation between the output classes.
To increase the output class correlation, Hinton, et al., [26]
propose using a temperature parameter, T , to normalize the
logit value. Higher values of T cause the probability scores
to be distributed more evenly thereby better reflecting the
correlation between classes. Specifically,
p = softmax(z/T ) (3)
where p ∈ Rc×1 are the output probability scores w.r.t. each
class, softmax (2) is a function which is usually applied to
a vector to generate probability scores, z ∈ Rc×1 are the
logit values (i.e., the output of the previous layer which is
input to the softmax function) output by a deep neural network
f(x) applied on an input x. Intuitively when T is large, the
difference between the maximum and minimum normalized
logit values is small. Thus, the output probability values will
be pushed towards a more uniform distribution.
If the student model matches the soft targets on a large
transfer dataset, then we can say that the student model distills
most of the knowledge stored in the larger teacher model.
Note that the transfer set does not need to be constrained
to the original data used for training, but could be any data.
Therefore, we can formulate the model distillation problem as
soft target alignment via the cross-entropy loss between the
probability scores of the student model and teacher model.
In the distillation process, the student model typically uses
the same temperature as the teacher model. During training,
the temperature needs to be tuned for the best performance.
When deploying the student model, the standard softmax
function (2) should be utilized to set the probability scores
back to their normal values.
VI. DEFENSIVE METHODS
In this section, we review three methods for defending
against adversarial attacks including the distillation, ensemble,
and weight decay defenses. Although the distillation and
ensemble defenses have been previously proposed, the weight
decay defense is new. Only the distillation defense has been
previously explored to defend against adversarial attacks in
malware detection applications, and this work was done in
the context of static malware classification [19].
Distillation Defense: The first defense we study is the
distillation defense [11], [19] where the model model is
trained using knowledge distillation. As discussed previously,
knowledge distillation is typically used to distall the knowl-
edge learned from a large model into a smaller network
making the smaller model more efficient in terms of its
memory, energy, or processing time in deployment. However,
in adversarial learning, the goal is to make the distilled model
more robust to adversarial perturbations, instead of focusing
on compressing the network size.
The motivation of using model distillation as a defense
mechanism is that with a higher temperature during the
distillation process, the error surface of the learned model can
be smoothed. We denote the function learned by the neural
network model as F . During the inference stage, the feature
vector is input into the trained network and transformed into
logit scores z ∈ Rc×1. Then a softmax function is used to con-
vert those scores into probabilities with respect to each class.
Mathematically, the Jacobian’s forward derivative of the output
with respect to the input can be calculated as follows [11],
[22]. For notational clarity, we denote the denominator of the
softmax function as h(x) =
c∑
k=1
(exp(zk)/T ), where T is the
temperature used during distillation. Thus, we have:
∂Fi
∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
(
ezi/T
h(x)
)
=
1
h2(x)
(
∂ezi(x)/T
∂xj
h(x)− ezi/T ∂h(x)
∂xj
)
=
1
T
ezi/T
h2(x)
(
c∑
k=1
(
∂zi
∂xj
− ∂zk
∂xj
)ezk/T ). (4)
From (4), we see that as the derivative becomes smaller with
higher temperature, the model is less sensitive to adversarial
perturbations.
Ensemble Defense: The ensemble defense for extraction
attacks and evasion attacks has been recently proposed by
several authors [12], [13], [15] for tree ensemble classifiers.
In this work, we study the ensemble defense with neural
networks. The idea behind the ensemble defense is intuitive.
It may be easy for an attacker to craft adversarial samples
to compromise an individual detection model, but it is much
more difficult for them to create samples which fool a set of
models in an ensemble with different properties. We employ a
“majority vote” ensemble defense in this work. We first train
an ensemble with E classifiers where E is an odd number.
During prediction, an unknown file is predicted to be malware
if the majority (i.e., > E/2) of the classifiers predict that the
file is malicious.
Weight Decay Defense: The third defense we propose and
study is the weight decay defense. Weight decay is typically
used to prevent overfitting of machine learning models. The
`2 norm of a weight matrix is defined as the square sum of all
the elements. By adding an `2 penalty of the model weights
in the objective function during optimization, the model is
encouraged to prefer smaller magnitude weights since large
values are penalized by the objective function.
With a smaller magnitude of weights, the function param-
eterized by the neural network is smoother, and therefore,
changes in the input space lead to smaller changes in the
output of a deep learning model. We conjecture that weight
decay could help alleviate the vulnerability of a deep learning
system against adversarial attacks.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the adversarial defenses against
the different attack strategies described in the previous sec-
tions. We first describe some details related to data preparation
and experimental setup. We then present the performance of
the baseline classification system which does not employ any
defenses. Finally, we evaluate the results for the distillation,
weight decay, and the ensemble defenses.
Data Preparation and Setup: In some cases, multiple files
can share the same input vector. Therefore, we only include
the first instance of a unique input vector and discard any
remaining duplicates. After de-duplication, we have input data
and labels from 2,373,671 files. A file is assigned the label of 1
if it is malware and 0 if it is benign. We then randomly split the
original dataset into a training set, validation set, and test set
including 1,523,978, 268,937, and 580,756 files, respectively.
In our training, we implement all models using the Mi-
crosoft Cognitive Toolkit (CNTK) [27]. All models are derived
from the baseline model described Section III. We use the
adam optimizer for training where the initial step size is set
to 0.1. Training proceeds for each step size until no further
improvement is observed in the validation error. At that point,
CNTK halves the step size for subsequent epochs. We train
for a maximum of 200 epochs, but CNTK implements early
stopping when no additional improvement in the validation
error is observed for a minimum step size of 1e-4.
Baseline Classifier: Before investigating the various de-
fenses, we first analyze the performance of the baseline
malware classifier useing the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves depicted in Figure 3 for a range of DNN
hidden layers, H , varying from 1 to 4. Malware classifiers
need to operate at very low false positive rates to avoid
false positive detections which may result in the removal of
critical operating system and legitimate application files. Thus,
our desired operating point is a false positive rate (FPR) of
0.01%. While the DNNs with multiple hidden layers offer
equivalent performance at higher false positive rates compared
to a shallow neural network with one hidden layer, the figures
indicates that the DNNs offer improved performance at very
low false positive rates. In particular, the false positive rate of
the shallow neural model immediately jumps to over 0.015%
which is above our desired operating point.
For reference, we next analyze the test error rates of the
baseline malware classification system in Table I. As observed
in [1] for a different dataset created for dynamic analysis
malware classification, a shallow neural network with a single
hidden layer provides the best overall accuracy. The test error
rates in Table I are computed with the probability that the
file is malicious pM ≥ 0.5. This threshold corresponds to
operating points with higher false positive rates on the ROC
curves for H ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4. These higher thresholds explain why
the shallow network has a better test error, but the ROC curves
indicate better performance for multiple hidden layers at the
same FPR.
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Fig. 3: ROC curves of the baseline malware classifier for
different numbers of hidden layers.
Layers Test Error Rate (%)
1 1.1378272
2 1.2053255
3 1.1762255
4 1.1619338
TABLE I: Test error rates of the baseline malware classifier
for different numbers of hidden layers.
Distillation Defense: We next analyze the performance of
the distillation defense system for all malware and benign
files. The ROC curves of the DNN systems employing the
distillation defense are presented in Figure 4 for temperature
setting T = 2 and Figure 5 for T = 10. We make several
observations from these figures. Both systems provide multiple
operating points below FPR = 0.01% which allows better fine-
tuning of the models. For the model with T = 2, we do
not observe any benefit from adding multiple hidden layers.
However, we do get a small lift in the performance for the
DNN with 4 hidden layers for T = 10. Both systems offer
similar performance above an FPR = 0.02% compared to the
baseline classifiers in Figure 3.
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Fig. 4: ROC curves of the malware classifiers with the dis-
tillation defense with T = 2 for different numbers of hidden
layers.
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Fig. 5: ROC curves of the malware classifiers with the distil-
lation defense with T = 10 for different numbers of hidden
layers.
In Figure 6, we next investigate the effectiveness of the six
adversarial sample crafting strategies for the baseline classifiier
and distillation defense, with temperatures T =∈ {2, 10}, for
model depths H ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. In each iteration, a single
feature is modified, and the generated sample is evaluated by
the trained model to test whether the sample is misclassified.
From Figure 6, we make several observations. Generally, the
distilled models follow a similar trend with regard to the six
strategies for crafting adversarial samples, where dec pos and
dec pos+inc neg are the two most effective strategies for the
attacker. With a higher distillation temperature, it becomes
much harder to craft adversarial samples for the distilled
model. If the same number of features is perturbed, the success
rate for crafting adversarial samples is reduced significantly
for models distilled with a higher temperature. This result is
because the error surface of the distilled model is smoothed
for higher temperatures, such that the output is less sensitive
with respect to the input.
We summarize the success of the different iterative strate-
gies for crafting adversarial samples after iteration 20 in
Figures 7 for the baseline classifier, Figure 8 for T = 2,
and Figure 9 for T = 10. The figures indicate that shallow
networks with H = 1 hidden layers are the most susceptible
to successfully crafted adversarial samples. We see that using
the Jacobian information can help to craft more adversarial
samples with the same number of perturbed features than its
randomized counterparts. From the attacker’s perspective, the
dec pos strategy (switching off positive malware features) is
the most effective approach for crafting adversarial samples for
the full defense with T = 10. Likewise, dec pos + inc neg
(alternatively switching off positive feature and switching on
negative feature) is more effective than inc neg (switching
on negative features). This is fortunate from the defender’s
perspective because it requires the attacker to potentially spend
more effort implementing alternative strategies for removing
malicious features.
Weight Decay Defense: We next present an analysis of
the proposed weight decay defense. We train the malware
classification model using different strengths of weight decay
regularization, D ∈ {0.0001, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.01}, and plot
the ROC curves for these values of D in Figures 10-13,
respectively. In general, the true positive rates drop with
increasing values of D.
We analyze all combinations of weight decay strength and
hidden layer depth in terms of defense to adversarial attacks.
The best overall resilience of this model defense to the six
adversarial sample crafting strategies for iteration 20 also
employs D = 0.0001 and is summarized in Figure 14. For
comparison, we also summarize the defensive capabilities for
D = 0.0005 in Figure 15. Figure 14 shows that the resilience
to adversarial sample crafting strategies also increases as the
hidden layer depth increases. The weight decay defense is not
as effective as the distillation defense in Figure 9 or even the
basline model in Figure 7.
Ensemble Defense: Finally, we present the results for the
ensemble defense on our dataset. In Figure 17, we present
the ROC curves for an ensemble with E = 5 classifiers.
Ensembles with other numbers of classifiers offer similar
results.
The summary results after 20 iterations for E = 3 and
E = 5 classifiers are shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19,
respectively. The figures indicate that increasing the number
of classifiers in the ensemble make increases the difficulty of
successfully crafting adversarial examples. Furthermore, the
ensemble defense greatly reduces the percentage of success-
fully crafted samples compared to the results for the baseline
classifier in Figure 7 and the distillation defense with T = 10
in Figure 9.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We next present previous research related to our study. First
we describe previous papers related to adversarial learning in
general. We then discuss papers related to adversarial learning
to either create or detect adversarial malware samples.
Adversarial Attacks: Adversarial attacks and defense for
deep learning models have been a popular research topic
recently due to the wide range applications of deep learning
models. Goodfellow, et al., [8] demonstrated that deep learning
models can be fooled by crafting adversarial samples from the
original input data by adding a perturbation on the direction of
the sign of the model’s cost function gradient. This method is
known as the fast gradient sign method. For images which are
considered in their paper, the algorithm computes the gradient
information once and perturbs all of the pixels to a certain
amplitude. Since the fast gradient sign method requires contin-
uous features, it is not applicable to our malware classification
data which is composed of sparse binary features.
Papernot, et al., [22] proposed another algorithm for crafting
adversarial samples, which iteratively perturbs the input along
the dimension with largest gradient saliency. The algorithm
perturbs one input feature in each iteration until the altered
sample is misclassified into the desired target class. The goal
of this method is to use the minimum perturbation to the
original sample such that the perturbation is not perceivable by
humans, but is misclassified by a machine learning model. This
algorithm has a larger computational complexity compared to
the fast gradient sign method in [8], because in each iteration,
the algorithm needs to compute the derivative of the model’s
output probability with respect to the perturbed sample.
In most cases, users do not have the knowledge about
the architecture and parameters of the trained model that are
deployed into a service. Deployed models are known as black
box models due to the fact that the attacker does not have
any information beyond the outputs of the model on input
queries. Papernot, et al., [7] proposed a method based on
model distillation to craft adversarial attack samples on black
box models. The authors in [7] found that adversarial samples
are transferable among models, i.e., the adversarial samples
crafted for one model can also mislead the classification
of other models. They use model distillation techniques to
compromise an oracle hosted by MetaMind. In this case, the
oracle is a defensive system where the users only know the
input and output, but they do not know anything about the
architecture of the model.
A defensive strategy using model distillation is proposed
in [11]. Model distillation is performed by using the soft labels
(prediction probability on a trained neural network) as the
label of training samples to train a new deep neural network.
They found that distillation captures class correlation, and the
model trained on soft labels is more robust than one trained
using hard labels. In this case, a hard label is specified as
the discrete class label. The authors also found that using a
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Fig. 6: Success rates of adversarial samples against the baseline classifer and the using defensive distillation with temperatures,
T ∈ 2, 10. Each subfigure shows the results of a DNN with different number of hidden layers, H .
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Fig. 7: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
for different sample crafting strategies for the baseline model
with no defense.
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Fig. 8: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
for different sample crafting strategies with the distillation
defense and T = 2.
high temperature in distillation training enforces smoothness
of the model, which could make the model more robust
to adversarial samples. Using the high temperature distilled
model, the changes in adversarial samples have much less
impact on the classification of the model.
Several authors [12], [13], [14], [15] have proposed using
an ensemble of models to avoid different type of malicious
attacks. For example, the authors in [13] proposed using an
ensemble of models to improve the privacy of deployed models
since attackers will only be able to obtain an approximation
of the target prediction function. Kantchelian, et al., [12]
proposed two algorithms for evasion attacks on tree ensemble
classifiers, like gradient boosted trees and random forests.
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Fig. 9: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
for different sample crafting strategies with the distillation
defense and T = 10.
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Fig. 10: ROC curves of the malware classifiers for the regu-
larization defense with D = 0.0001 for different numbers of
hidden layers.
However, each tree classifier is very weak compared with a
full-fledged neural network.
Malware Classification: Several deep learning malware
classifiers are proposed in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. The first
study of deep learning for a DNN malware classifier was
presented in [1]. Similar to our results, the authors found that
a shallow neural network slightly outperformed a DNN on
dynamic analysis-based malware classification. Saxe, et al.,
studied DNNs in the context of static malware classification
in [2]. Huang and Stokes proposed a deep, multi-task approach
for dynamic analysis which simultaneously tries to optimize
predicting a) if a file is malicious or benign and b) the
file’s family if it is malware or returning a benign label in
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Fig. 11: ROC curves of the malware classifiers for the regu-
larization defense with D = 0.0005 for different numbers of
hidden layers.
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Fig. 12: ROC curves of the malware classifiers for the regu-
larization defense with D = 0.001 for different numbers of
hidden layers.
the case it is clean. In [3], the authors propose a two-stage
approach where the first stage employs a language-model,
using a recurrent neural network (RNN) or an echo state
network (ESN), to first learn an embedding of the behavior
of the file based on its system call events. This embedding
then serves as the features for a DNN in the second stage.
Athiwaratkun, et al., [5] explored similar architectures for
deep malware classification using long short-term memory
(LSTM) or a gated recurrent units (GRU) for the language
model, as well as a separate architecture using a character-
level convoluation neural network (CNN). In [6], Kolosnjaji,
et al., propose an alternative model also employing a CNN
and an LSTM.
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Fig. 13: ROC curves of the malware classifiers for the reg-
ularization defense with D = 0.01 for different numbers of
hidden layers.
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Fig. 14: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
after iteration 20 for different sample crafting strategies with
the weight decay defense with D = 0.0001.
Several authors have proposed methods for creating adver-
sarial malware samples. In [10], Xu, et al., propose a system
which uses a genetic algorithm to generate adversarial samples
which can be mispredicted by a classifier. The system assumes
access to the classifier’s output score. The authors demonstrate
that their system can automatically create 500 malicious PDF
files that are classified as benign by the PDFrate [28] and
Hidost [29] systems.
Hu and Tan [18] propose a generative adversarial network
(GAN) to create adversarial malware samples. In their work,
the authors assume that the attackers know the features which
are employed by the malware classifier, but they do not know
the classification model or its parameters. They use static
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Fig. 15: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
after iteration 20 for different sample crafting strategies with
the weight decay defense with D = 0.0005.
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Fig. 16: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial sam-
ples for the first 20 iterations with different sample crafting
strategies, D = 0.0005 weight decay and L = 3 hidden layers.
analysis where the features are API calls and a sparse binary
feature is constructed to indicate which APIs were called
by the program. Furthermore, the authors assume that the
prediction score from the model is reported from the malware
classification model.
Grosse, et al., [19] study the distillation defense for static
analysis-based malware classification. Similar to this paper,
the authors assume that the attacker has access to all of the
deep learning malware classifier’s model parameter. In our
work, we also consider the distillation defense for dynamic
analysis-based malware classification. In addition, we evaluate
the ensemble defense and introduce the regularization defense
for a dynamic malware classifier. In another recent paper,
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Fig. 17: ROC curves of the ensemble malware classifier with
E = 5 classifiers for different numbers of hidden layers.
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Fig. 18: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
after iteration 20 for different sample crafting strategies with
the N = 3 ensemble defense.
Grosse, et al., [20] add a separate class for adversarial samples
and propose a statistical hypothesis test to identify adversarial
samples.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated six different adversarial learn-
ing attack strategies against a dynamic analysis-based, deep
learning malware classification system. We analyzed the ef-
fectiveness of two previously proposed defensive methods in-
cluding the distillation defense and ensemble defense. We also
proposed and analyzed the weight decay defense. All three
defenses offer comparable classification accuracies compared
to a standard deep learning baseline system. Thus, they achieve
a key goal in adversarial learning of not significantly reducing
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Fig. 19: Percentage of successfully crafted adversarial samples
after iteration 20 for different sample crafting strategies with
the N = 5 ensemble defense.
the accuracy compared to a system without any adversarial
learning defenses. In addition, deep learning models offer
better resilience to adversarial attacks than the shallow baseline
models in all cases.
Results show that the ensemble classifier provides signif-
icantly better resiliency against adversarial attacks for this
dataset when compared to the other defenses, but requires
more computational resources for both training and inference.
The distillation offers the second best resistance, and helps
to reduce the effectiveness of removing important malicious
features. The weight decay defense offers little defense against
crafted adversarial samples.
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